The logician need not decide if there is such a thing as reality

We cannot hide from ourselves that there are objects 
very nearly like real things
We are obliged to suppose that there is knowledge 
embodied in some form
and that there is inference
and that
one embodiment of knowledge
affects another

I see in this parsing of Feibleman on Peirce 1969 83-84
a clear suggestion of Peircean threes
and one of the remarkable instances in which 
the wonder of Peirce can be apprehended
The key word for me is suppose
After suppose in the text comes the parenthetical
("it need not assert")
a delicious reminder of the degree of
supposition (vagueness, musement) involved in all thinking


Logic is not about how we think but about how we ought to think 

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